

JPRS 78325

18 June 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1767



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

18 June 1981

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1767

CONTENTS

ENERGY ECONOMICS

SPAIN

- Industry Minister Comments on Energy Problems
(Ignacio Mayon Interview; YA, 6 May 81) 1

ECONOMIC

GREECE

- PASOK Positions at European Parliament Reported
(EXORMISI, 9 May 81) 5

POLITICAL

DENMARK

- Poll Registers Continued Decline for Socialists
(LAND OG FOLK, 2, 3 May 81) 9

DENMARK/GREENLAND

- Pan-Eskimo Movement Urged To Give Up on Cooperation With USSR
(Editorial; GRONLANDSPOSTEN, 23 Apr 81) 11

FINLAND

- Country Believed Well Stocked With Strategic Metals
(Bjorn Sundell; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 3 May 81) 13
- Defense Planning Commission Chief Urges Industry Organize
(HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 6 May 81) 16

GREECE

- Political Dialogue Between ND, PASOK Intensifies
(Nikos Simos; O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, 14 May 81) 18

PORTUGAL

- Soares Said To Seek Presidency in 1985
(Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa; EXPRESSO, 16 May 81) 22

SPAIN

- Tamames Comments on Reasons for Resignation
(Ramon Tamames Interview; EL PAIS, 12 May 81) 28

TURKEY

- Relationship of Regime to Citizen Assessed
(Editorial, Metin Toker; MILLIYET, 31 May 81) 32

MILITARY

DENMARK

- Defense Minister Sogaard Discusses Reinforcement Policy
(Poul Sogaard; INFORMATION, 24 Apr 81) 35
- Social Democratic Spokesman for Military Sees Budget Pact
(INFORMATION, 1 May 81) 37

SWEDEN

- Reporters Visit Karlsborg Missile Testing Base
(Kjell Lofberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 May 81) 39
- Armed Forces' Test Area
Missiles Are Salvaged

GENERAL

FRANCE

- Military, Civil Pilot Medical Examination Centers
(Blanc; AIR ACTUALITES, Mar 81) 42

INDUSTRY MINISTER COMMENTS ON ENERGY PROBLEMS

Madrid YA in Spanish 6 May 81 p 25

[Interview with Minister of Industry and Energy Ignacio Bayon, by Maria Merida; date and place not given]

[Text] "The main problem confronting Spanish industry is the lack of competitiveness, which is more evident, if one may say so, when our products go abroad. The low productivity indexes and the high percentage of our personnel and financing costs in comparison with the billing, without overlooking the fact that our industry does not have a sizable technology of its own, are the most direct causes for the lack of the desired competitiveness of our products." The minister of industry and energy, Ignacio Bayon, expressed himself in these terms upon starting his assessment of the current status of industry and energy in our country.

[Question] Has not the energy factor also had an effect on that lack of competitiveness?

[Answer] Obviously, the energy factor is essential in the production lines. While energy was plentiful and cheap, its effect on the final cost hardly needed to be considered. But the escalation in oil prices, including other types of energy in its same situation, has raised that final cost of the product to figures which could prove profitable only with a thorough renovation of the industrial sector. Hence the urgent need to deal with the process of industrial conversion with the utmost haste, so as to be in a competitive situation when it is time for us to join the EEC.

[Question] At the present time, what is the status of the sectors in a crisis situation attempting to carry out that reconversion and to be in the necessary position when it is time to enter the EEC?

[Answer] The first concern that occupied my attention when I took over the Ministry of Industry and Energy in May 1980 was to seek solutions to extricate various sectors from the deep slump in which they were submerged. After a series of talks, that of the soft line household electric products was resolved, and then that of special steels; and at present, after long negotiations, that of the entire iron and steel industry is about to be resolved. Negotiations have also begun now for the reconversion of the shipbuilding sector; and later there will come those for the textile and footwear industries, among others. I would like to point out that,

in this process of reconversion or restructuring of sectors in a state of crisis, the administration's role is merely that of establishing the goals and providing the legal framework for making our industry more competitive. It is within that framework that business owners and workers must negotiate until the final agreements have been achieved.

[Question] But all that reconversion necessitates making decisions that are difficult for business owners and workers to accept. Isn't that so?

[Answer] Yes, it is actually something hard, but necessary. What cannot be accepted is that these sectors continue to lose money which, in the long run, would lead to their disappearance, with a greater evil, for which the workers would be the first to pay the consequences. The present time, particularly in recent years when the oil crisis has become entrenched in the Western economies, has led to situations which cannot last much longer if we do not want to end up missing the boat of industrial development which we had apparently boarded during the 1970's. Competitiveness, productivity, quality and, in turn, marketing and exporting aggressiveness, are all interconnected factors which must enter into a framework for industrial reconversion which the 1980's require without delay.

The Dependence on Oil

[Question] To what extent has consideration been given to reducing our dependence on oil, by using other more accessible energy alternatives, and what dates have you set for putting it into practice?

[Answer] Our Ministry of Industry and Energy would not have that name if we were not considering alternate types of energy other than oil. The main goal of the PEN [National Energy Plan] is to reduce that dependence on oil to less than 50 percent by the year 1985 (because it now stands at about 62 percent). In that search for alternate types of energy there is, in the first place, nuclear energy, followed by coal, the production of which we are intensifying at a rapid pace; and natural gas, the participation of which in primary energy must be increased from 2 percent at present to 5.4 percent by the end of the PEN. Another concern of the ministry is the maximum utilization of the volume of flow of our rivers which, although it has been exploited considerably from the standpoint of electrical production, still has resources available for accruing output that is by no means to be underestimated.

[Question] And what about the kinds of energy that we might term future types?

[Answer] Solar ranks in first place, and we are devoting special attention to it, considering the fact that our country, because it belongs to the Mediterranean basin, enjoys a rather large number of hours of sunlight, particularly in southern Spain. I shall not remind you here of the many projects, involving both research and development, being carried out by the ministry. I shall only mention the two powerplants in Almeria (one of them in cooperation with the International Energy Agency); as well as another powerplant for the more distant future, to be built in the Extremadura region, which will have the greatest power in the world for this type of energy. Finally, I consider it necessary to recall that, although our aim is to free ourselves insofar as possible from this dependence on oil, we must not forget that Spain, even though it is not a country with abundant hydrocarbons, does

have deposits the volume of which contributes to an extent not to be underestimated toward withstanding the heavy burden of our crude imports. Hence, the intensification of searches for oil and natural gas as well has been constant. Considering the deposits in the Mediterranean, especially the Casablanca one, and those of natural gas in northern Huesca and the Gulf of Cadiz, it is possible that, at the conclusion of the PEN, Spain may have its own supply of energy in the form of hydrocarbons to meet about 10 percent of its total consumption.

The Future of Nuclear Energy

[Question] Is there an intention of stepping up nuclear energy to the maximum extent? What are the possibilities for the near future?

[Answer] It is not a matter of mere possibilities. There is a completely established program in existence, namely, the National Energy Plan, approved by the Congress of Deputies in July 1979, whereby a volume of investments amounting to 1.6 billion pesos for the 4-year period 1980-83 alone, is being made. Now then, the nuclear powerplants alone have brought that figure to about 400 million pesetas. By the end of the PEN, nuclear energy's participation in the primary energy structure will stand at 13 percent. At the present time, we already have four powerplants in operation: Zorita de los Canes, in Guadalajara; Santa Maria de Garona, in Burgos; Vandellos I, in Tarragona; and the newly opened first group of the Almaraz powerplant, in Caceres, with a total installed power of over 2,000 megawatts.

On the occasion of the recent visit to Spain by the Saudi Arabian oil minister, Sheik Yamani, he discussed with Minister Ignacio Bayon our relations with that country, the percentage of our oil supply from Saudi Arabia and the guarantees for the supply, in addition to the terms established for guaranteeing us the stability of the prices.

Spain has always been a country friendly toward Saudi Arabia, and therefore we expect our relations with that country to continue along that path of friendship and understanding, irrespective of economic interests. However, the policy, which is not at odds with the economy, but quite the contrary, makes it possible to combine these two factors wonderfully. Hence, since Saudi Arabia is a country with abundant oil, it is logical for Spain to approach it to purchase the latter. In 1980, of our total crude imports, 32 percent came from Saudi Arabia; in other words, this country was our leading oil supplier. As for the guarantees for supply and price stability, Spain still trusts in those good relations that I have mentioned.

Guarantees for Supply

[Question] What guarantees for oil supplies do we have with the other producing countries?

[Answer] It would appear that the world oil market has embarked on a situation marked by greater security, and greater guarantees: in short, one of stabilization. In this regard, we should not forget that this situation has not been reached without sacrifices. The policies for energy savings devised by the International Energy Agency, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries and other Western agencies, always backed by Spain, have resulted in a reduction

in the dependence on oil. If we add to this the incessant search for new alternative sources of energy, production processes with a lower energy cost and an awareness acquired by the citizens that they must not waste energy, one can readily infer that the producing countries have not disregarded our response. For all these reasons, it is not rash to claim that, at the present time, supplies are far more secure than they were a year ago, without going any further.

It should be noted that, during 1980, over 1.5 million tons of crude were extracted from the different deposits on the Mediterranean continental shelf; and, this year, it is expected to attain 2 million, representing approximately 4 percent of our oil consumption. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that Spain has major contracts in effect with Mexico, a country which does not belong to OPEC. Also to be added to the aforementioned figure is the oil obtained from our concessions in various Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt and the Arab Emirates, totaling about 4 million tons. In 1981, our bill for oil imports will be about \$14 million.

[Question] Minister, could you tell us, in conclusion, whether new immediate increases are planned for electric energy rates?

[Answer] The government's policy is to apply real prices which are consistent with the costs, without overlooking the fact that our country has opted for a market economy. Therefore, the electric energy prices will at all times depend on the costs of obtaining it. A change in the rates will take place starting in the second half of this year, but this will not be a hike based on readjustment of the product-costs. This 5 percent increase in the average price of energy is actually a tax approved by Parliament in the law regulating energy rates. The electric companies will merely be intermediaries in collecting this tax, just collectors who will have to settle on a quarterly basis with the Treasury which, in turn, will distribute what has been collected to the provincial and local corporations in proportion to the electric power generated in each province.

2909

CSO: 3110/114

PASOK POSITIONS AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPORTED

Athens EXORMISI in Greek 9 May 81 p 4

[Text] With interjections by PASOK deputies in discussions at the European Parliament on matters of vital importance to Greece, PASOK has found itself once again in the foreground in the European arena.

Specifically, the PASOK parliamentary representative G. Kharalambopoulos joined the debate in the European Parliament by speaking about supports to Greece from the EEC Community Fund. Deputy A. Peponis addressed himself to the subject of "the fouling and polluting of the environment," while K. Nikolaou referred in his interjection to the advisory report by Friedrich, in connection with the political restructuring of the iron industry.

We are publishing below the speeches of the PASOK deputies to the plenum of the European Parliament:

G. Kharalambopoulos

In reference to the proposal by the Executive Committee to the council on increasing the share of financial support given by the European Community Fund to Greece, but with the nomes of Athens and Salonica excluded from this, we note that:

Consideration should be given to the more general social and economic situation in Greece, where inflation is approaching 30 percent and the actual rate of unemployment, as is mentioned in the proposal of the committee, is set at between 15 percent and 17.8 percent.

In conjunction with the fact that 45 percent of the country's total population and 50 percent of its economically active population are concentrated in the nomes of Athens and Salonica, we conclude that unemployment and underemployment in these areas, especially as concerns young people, is reaching disquieting levels. Moreover, we should state that the gross income per capita in Greece comes to scarcely 43.4 percent of the average Community income--something which shows clearly the difference in development and living standards between Greece and the other member countries of the European Community.

We note also that 70 percent of the infrastructures for vocational training are found in the excluded areas of Athens and Salonica.

Moreover, taking into consideration the unsatisfactory nature, as far as our country is concerned, of the average level of price increases for agricultural products as were fixed by the recent decision of the council, we agree with and support the view of the proposer, the Italian committee reporter (Dindo), and our judgment is that the measure on an increased percentage of financial support from the European Community Fund ought to include the areas of Athens and Salonica, since from the data which we referred to above it is clear that the principal subjects of such an intervention by the European Community Fund are concentrated in the above areas.

On the basis of the fact that a country such as Ireland, which at the time of its accession to the EEC showed developmental indices similar to those of Greece, was characterized as a whole as a "priority area" and received the increased share of financial support from the European Community Fund without any exclusions, we believe that the same opportunities ought to be given to Greece which were given to other member states, and that any deviation from this rule constitutes a flagrant discrimination against Greek interests.

A. Peponis

The proposal by the committee (of the European Communities) being discussed and the guidelines of the council (of ministers) to which it refers touch upon problems which have literally tragic dimensions for the people of the large urban centers in Greece--that is, for the people of Athens, Piraeus, Salonica, and so forth.

Beginning in 1979 and continuing up to the present, at intervals coming closer and closer together, the greater Athens area has been suffocating from so-called photochemical clouds due to photochemical pollution.

Cement factories, steel mills, petroleum refineries, all of them densely crowded into the area around the Gulf of Elefsis scarcely 22 kilometers away from downtown Athens, are emitting about 50,000 tons of sulfur dioxide per year, according to the data we are considering. That is, they are emitting 1/4 of the total amount emitted of sulfur dioxide in the large area of Athens-Piraeus, with a population which exceeds 3 million residents.

Faced with this situation, it is understandable that the people of Greece will wonder: To what use will the protection being discussed and the corresponding guideline 80/779/15 July 1980 of the Council of Ministers be put? This guideline defines maximum permissible limits both for sulfur anhydride and for suspended particulates. Furthermore, it introduces certain obligations and a procedure for exchanging information.

The environmental and public-health problem in Greece--continued A. Peponis--is a political and social problem. The choking atmosphere, the almost lethal cloud which is suffocating the people of Athens and Piraeus as well as other areas, is a product of the inhuman and antisocial attitude which guides the decisions and the activity of domestic and foreign capitalists.

Subsequently, the PASOK speaker said the following:

The guidelines of the Council of Ministers provide for giving and exchanging information. But certain industries--not all, certainly--are trying in every way possible to keep uninformed the people directly and primarily involved in this problem--that is, the Greek people themselves.

What primarily interests us, the deputies of PASOK, is of course the informing of our people and their representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, in the organizations of local self-government, in the trade unions. But note this: The Association of Greek Industrialists itself, in its bulletin 423/30 September 1980, urges its members to avoid giving out any relevant data to ecological research centers, to organizations or to other organized public-benefit agencies which are concerned with pollution and the environment. Note also its justification for this: It says that this granting of data gives rise to confusion....

And yet the only struggle, and we are indebted to it, which is being waged now in Greece is due to the public-benefit agencies, to public organizations, to certain municipalities and communities, and to journalists.

And A. Peponis concluded: We are obliged to say here that as far as Greece is concerned the regulations which the EEC is legislating for the environment are and will remain empty words, when by other means, through other channels, with other methods, backing and support is given to the network of capitalist interests which want Greece to be dependent, technologically backward, and with its soil and its sea given over to the unaccountability of profiteering.

And, let us not forget it, the network of interests and the network of political forces which brought Greece to the environmental situation which I described to you is precisely the same network which has led to the accession of Greece to the EEC, in contrast to PASOK, which proposed and proposes still a special relation of association. Everybody can draw his own conclusions from this.

K. Nikolaou

Undoubtedly the crisis which has struck the European iron industry from 1975 on constitutes a phenomenon which is without precedence in the history of the EEC. But the fact is equally indubitable that the Greek iron industry did not play any role whatsoever in this crisis. And it is truly strange that the Greek iron industry is being called upon by the committee to decrease its production by 20 percent on the basis of the quota system for the very first time now that our country has become a full member of the Community.

Thus, for the sake of the restructuring of the European iron industry, which finds itself structurally with excess productive capacities, according to the EEC Greece should decrease its production of steel, which after all is running at 60 percent of its actual capacity.

It is well known that the total production of Greek steel amounts to scarcely 1 percent of the European production. The major portion is destined for the Greek market, and the remainder is bound for Arab countries. With these things

in mind, the conclusion emerges that the EEC is now forcing Greece either to stop its exports to the Arab countries, or to import additional European steel in order to meet the needs of its domestic market. In either case, the outcome is detrimental to us, both at the level of our balance of payments and also with respect to the Greek economy more generally.

And at the same time it becomes irritating when the interests which are being served through the implementation of this policy are those of the large European plants. PASOK will vote against the Friedrich report, which is in agreement with the measures taken up to now in the sector of the steel industry (points 5 and 24), because it believes that these measures hurt the national interests of our country.

12114

CSO: 4908/168

POLL REGISTERS CONTINUED DECLINE FOR SOCIALISTS

Copenhagen LAND OG FOLK in Danish 2-3 May 81 p 3

[Text] The Social Democrats would register a strong decline if an election had been held in April while the communists as well as the three largest nonsocialist parties would have registered gains compared with the 1979 Folketing election as well as the March opinion poll according to a survey conducted for BERLINGSKE TIDENDE by Gallup in the period 4-15 April.

The analysis was scheduled for publication in BERLINGSKE SONDAG.

The Social Democrats, who received 38.3 percent of the votes in the 1979 election, got 35 percent in the April poll, down 3.4 percent from March.

The communists, who are not currently represented in Folketing, got 4.0 percent of the support in the April poll.

But the two other left-wing parties, SF [Socialist People's Party] and VS [Left-Socialist Party] lost voter support since March although the Socialist People's Party is still better off than it was in the 1979 election.

The government's three compromise parties, the Radical Liberals, the Center-Democrats and the Christian People's Party are now at about the same levels they had in the March survey and in the 1979 election.

The three largest nonsocialist opposition parties--the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Progressives--all advanced. The Conservative Party is still the biggest opposition party, as it has been in almost all the opinion polls since the election.

The Gallup survey shows four parties lying close to the 2 percent cutoff limit. These are the Single-Tax Party, the Center-Democrats, the Christian People's Party and the Left-Socialists, all of them registering support levels of under 3 percent.

<u>Party</u>	<u>1979 Election</u>	<u>March</u>	<u>April</u>
Social Democrats	38.3	36.7	33.4
Radical Liberals	5.4	5.5	5.6
Conservatives	12.5	13.4	13.8
Single-Tax Party	2.6	2.7	2.5
Socialist People's Party	5.9	7.6	6.6
Danish Communist Party	1.9	--	4.0
Center-Democrats	3.2	2.2	2.7
Christian People's Party	2.6	2.5	2.6
Communist Workers Party	0.4	--	--
Liberals	12.5	12.5	13.6
Left-Socialists	3.7	4.0	2.7
Progressives	11.0	11.6	12.5
Others	--	1.3	--

On the basis of the Gallup analysis RITZAUS BUREAU figured out the distribution of seats in parliament if an election had the same results as the survey. The numbers in parenthesis are the present number of seats:

Social Democrats: 58 (68); Radical Liberals: 10 (10); Conservatives: (2?) [as written]; Single-Tax Party: 4 (5); Socialist People's Party: 12 (11); Danish Communist Party: 7 (0); Center-Democrats: 5 (6); Christian People's Party: 5 (5); Liberals 24 (22); Left-Socialists 5 (6) and Progressives: 22 (20).

6578

CSO: 3106/117

PAN-ESKIMO MOVEMENT URGED TO GIVE UP ON COOPERATION WITH USSR

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 23 Apr 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The cultural committee of the Eskimo cooperation movement just held a meeting in Nuuk. It asked the ICC [expansion unknown] board to request the governments of Denmark, Canada and the United States to facilitate cultural cooperation among the Eskimo populations of their countries. Recognition of examinations and access to work permits is sought.

It is an attractive thought that ICC might get into Nordic cooperation. Removal of passport restrictions and a free flow of labor should be the goal in Eskimo lands. We have reached the point today where passports are not required for Eskimos going between Greenland and Arctic Canada.

But cooperation in the other direction is not going as well. At the first ICC meeting, arranged by Professor Jean Malaurie in France in 1969, the East bloc was conspicuous by its absence. Participants from that time recall how excited they were at the prospect of meeting Eskimo representatives from the big closed nation. But the excitement turned into disappointment.

This was repeated at the 1980 ICC meeting in Nuuk. And now once more at the meeting of the cultural committee.

The representative from Siberia did not show up. He was looked for everywhere but no one knew where he was.

After that all efforts to approach the East must be regarded as fruitless. The socialist state will not permit contacts among Eskimos.

Thus high-level politics are involved in ICC cooperation. And the fate of ICC depends on the political attitude in Greenland. Greenlanders are the only majority in the Eskimo world and Greenland is the most developed Arctic area. This country can play an important role in Arctic cooperation.

But a socialist Greenland would be a lifeless country in the ICC context. Contacts with the West would be cut off the minute Greenland adopted socialist

principles. Neither Canada nor the United States would allow cooperation between their minorities and a socialist state.

And a socialist experiment in Greenland is an impossible idea in the higher political context. Greenland belongs to the western hemisphere and under the Monroe Doctrine it is irrevocably bound to the defense of the western world.

Thus Eskimo cooperation depends on recognition of western principles. Let Karl Marx lie. That is in the best interests of the Eskimo people.

6578

CSO: 3106/117

COUNTRY BELIEVED WELL STOCKED WITH STRATEGIC METALS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 May 81 p 14

[Article by Bjorn Sundell]

[Excerpts] Today HUFVUDSTADSBLADET begins a series of articles on the availability of strategic minerals. These include chromium, cobalt, manganese, vanadium and tungsten, among others. These raw materials are important in keeping industry going, even during a crisis.

In the first part of the series we will deal with the concentration of raw materials in certain countries in the world and look into Finland's vulnerability.

Many of the world's most important minerals are concentrated in a few countries; this is true of chromium, cobalt, vanadium and many others. Some of these few are politically unstable as well, so it is not surprising that more and more industrialized nations are beginning to ask themselves if their supplies of raw materials leave them vulnerable. What would happen if a crisis occurred and supplies of raw materials from South Africa, Korea, Zambia or China are no longer delivered? The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq is still fresh in our minds, and we remember the tense situation in the industrialized lands when their oil supplies were threatened. Larger stockpile requirements are also starting to be made with regard to raw materials as well.

It is hardly a secret that ores are unevenly distributed around the world. In reality ore itself is something abnormal, a curiosity in the bedrock, and it is hard to say why some countries are rich in minerals while others must live in an impoverished state.

"Actually Finland's situation is quite fortunate.

"We have more different kinds of metals in our ore veins than most other European countries," said director Heikki Tanner, who is associated with the Outokumpu mining company.

Only a Few Missing--Today

Of the so-called strategic minerals, the ones important for keeping industry going in a crisis, only tungsten, manganese and molybdenum are in short supply. We produce cobalt--5 percent of the world production occurs in this country. We have chromium and we are the largest producer of it in Europe--the others are quite insignificant compared with us. We have copper, nickel and zinc.

Our problem is that many mines will be exhausted, some as early as 5 or 10 years from now. Large new finds have not been made.

As mentioned earlier we have a sizable cobalt production in Finland.

Airam is really the only purchaser of tungsten metal or carbide in Finland, other users buy it in more refined form.

Manganese is not mined in Finland or in the rest of Europe really except in the Soviet Union.

Too Expensive to Mine

Manganese has been mined in Finland. When the war was raging and business economic calculations were turned head over heels manganese was extracted from the lake ores in Savolax. It was expensive but this was justified by our great need in the '40's.

With regard to molybdenum there are known deposits in Finland but they are not mined. Molybdenum is used in acid-resistant steel and the deposits here are concentrated in a belt extending from Chile to Alaska. Half the production is in the hands of an American multinational company, Amax.

According to Outokumpu we in Finland have a reserve that could be quickly put on the market in case of a crisis and the same thing applies to Norway.

Grace Period of 2 Years

Finland's unique position in Europe goes beyond chromium and cobalt deposits; Finland is also Europe's largest producer of vanadium. Vanadium is needed in the manufacture of steel but the market price is not high enough to make production profitable for us in the long run.

The Rautaruukki mining company is in charge of vanadium production, with the mining taking place in the Mustavaara mine. The mine is operating at a loss because production costs are higher than the sales price on vanadium and for some time the Mustavaara mine has lived under the shadow of being shut down. The mine has been given a 2-year grace period by Rautaruukki.

"We will keep going for 2 years for employment and strategic reasons despite the fact that the mine is losing money," said the man who built up Rautaruukki from the beginning, mining consultant Helge Haavisto.

It is not entirely definite that the mine will be closed after 2 years but it is likely if vanadium prices do not improve considerably.

The strategic reasons that warrant a respite of several years are quite obvious. The really big producers besides little Finland are--once again--South Africa and China. Production there costs considerably less than it does here.

When Haavisto recently presented the Rautaruukki annual report he referred to the Mustavaara mine:

"Even if the mine is closed we must maintain our readiness. The machines will be kept oiled, in a manner of speaking, and we must be prepared to resume mining in the future if necessary. No one knows how demand will develop."

The mine may be put under wraps but the wraps can be removed. For strategic reasons.

Quiet Period in Finland

Not many people in Finland speak out often in public about strategic minerals. We have oil reserves and our grain stores are being built up gradually. Things are not going quite as well for stockpiles of strategic raw materials. The state has a small reserve supply but information about how large these reserves are is secret.

They have reserves for between 1 and 2 years in the United States, but here the supply would probably last only a few months.

One of those who wants greater emphasis put on stockpiles of raw materials is executive director Max Jakobson of the Trade Delegation, EVA. The following appeared in the publication *NATIONENS FRAMGANGSVILLKOR*:

"The stockpiles of raw materials in Finland cannot be regarded as satisfactory. There are hardly any real emergency reserves except for oil and grain. It is urgent that we correct this matter of reserves."

Are we so well supplied with minerals that we can passively keep up with what is being done elsewhere in the world or are we living in a dream? Or is something happening behind the scenes in the sector of emergency stockpiles?

The key to all this is in the hands of the Defense Economic Planning Commission which coordinates emergency preparations. Its work is not often discussed in the public debate. In the second part of the series on strategic minerals we will present the view of the commission as to whether Finland needs more emergency reserves.

DEFENSE PLANNING COMMISSION CHIEF URGES INDUSTRY ORGANIZE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 6 May 81 p 14

[Text] "We are hunting for a 'carrot' that will tempt industrial firms to set up their own emergency stockpiles," said minister Sakari T. Lehto, chairman of the Defense Economic Planning Commission. The group told the press about its activities yesterday--by coincidence the same day HUFVUDSTADSBLADET had its extensive interview with the commission's planning director, K. H. Pentti.

Our ability to withstand a crisis is clearly too low, it appeared from the interview in question, and that is also Lehto's estimate--while at the same time he stresses that the commission is not trying to create a mood of panic.

State emergency stockpiles involve mainly oil and grain as well as other vital necessities to the extent possible. In addition it is up to state authorities to plan and maintain conditions for crisis production needed to offset missing imports. Priorities are a difficult problem in this context.

Lehto pointed out that what is involved here is meeting all kinds of crisis from import disruptions in some sectors to a military situation that halts or limits all our foreign trade.

State stockpiles should be supplemented with individual state-subsidized stockpiles which would preferably cover all businesses--in Finnish this is called "turvavarastojärjestelmä" while state emergency stockpiles are called "varmuusvarasto." There are many advantages to having firms stockpile items they need--these stores tend to be kept more up-to-date than is the case with state stockpiles and they are cheaper for society even though they involve heavy costs, since firms are compensated for the extra expenses imposed by the stockpiles.

According to the Pentti interview a task force set up by the Ministry of Trade and Industry is working on these questions and is expected to make a report early this fall.

Really effective state stimulus measures are needed since under the current shortage of capital industry is largely living "from hand to mouth" and the idea of tying up money in stockpiles is not very attractive.

No Special Organ Needed

The head of the Trade Board, Erkki Sunila, outlined the development of our trade readiness in a crisis situation.

Business plans are based on existing legislation and Sunila maintains that the so-called Regulating Authority Act of 1970 has admirably retained its relevance and usability.

The plans require a unified picture of crisis conditions. This was provided by the 1977 Defense Council but of course constant development in planning crisis models is needed.

A cardinal principle is that activities during a crisis, both in administration and in production, should be based on the organizations and functional mechanisms prevailing under normal conditions. It is just a question of strengthening them, not of creating any special organ or carrying out any radical total economic mobilization. The present division of roles between business life and state administration would also be maintained during a period of crisis. If necessary at the height of a crisis the state could support or replace poorly functioning market mechanisms.

The idea of a totally regulated planned economy under exceptional conditions is blocked--luckily, in Sunila's view--by lack of resources and by the fact that it would require an enormous executive apparatus. There is plenty to do in the area of planning and insuring the function of the most vitally needed systems. One of the tasks of the commission is to analyze in detail these critical systems. We must not be lulled by a belief in the Finnish ability to improvise.

No New National Food Supply Ministry

In January the Defense Economic Planning Commission had its office expanded into a planning center with its staff enlarged to 12, a figure that will gradually increase to 18. An administrative office, an organization office and a resource office function under the planning director.

At the same time crisis economic planning is being renewed in the public administration sector. Each ministry has been given an emergency preparations chief. The process will be extended to include county and municipal administrations. All this seems to rule out the need for a new National Food Supply Ministry in the event of a crisis or a war.

6578

CSD: 3109/189

POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN ND, PASOK INTENSIFIES

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 14 May 81 p 9

(Article by Nikos Simos)

[Text] The pre-election contest, with a confrontation of the positions of the two large parties which is becoming more harsh in its expression, is growing more strident to the detriment of our lenient political climate. At the same time, our country's entering the last lap before the elections has meant also the commencement of the administration's announcements of pre-election favors. As early as last Sunday, Rallis announced at Larisa a reduction in electricity rates for agricultural operations and an increase in farmers' pensions, but he made the mistake of offsetting the impression of a high percentage of increase with a reference to the level which the tragically low farmer's pension finally reaches even after this increase.

On the other hand, the--belated--response of the New Democracy Party to the interview with TO VIMA by the chairman of PASOK (where the attempt is not to underscore the conversion of Mr Papandreou, but rather to stress his ostensibly insincere dedication to his new positions, supposedly taken for the sake of his rise to power) constitutes an additional indication that the two chief contenders for the title will be trying at every opportunity to sustain a continuing and intense dialogue, with the objective being to have the electorate reflect on the probabilities that the one or the other party is offering practical solutions.

In any case, the results of the French elections undoubtedly are creating a psychological "handicap" for the New Democracy, since the turn toward socialism by an EEC country which for a number of years had rightist administrations, either as a result of a more general social reaction or as a need for some sort of change, could influence the undecided Greek voter who is living in a country which has economic problems greater than those of the French citizen who has dared to make such a change. With socialist governments in the two most powerful countries of the EEC and with a greater similarity of PASOK positions to those of the German and French governments, surely the prospects for the party of the official opposition appear to be particularly auspicious--something, moreover, which the American side is not only anticipating but even treating now as a fact of nature.

"Carbon-copy" Results

After a period of 8 months, the new meetings between Minister of Foreign Affairs Mitsotakis and his colleagues from the United States and Turkey on foreign problems--which have monopolized the political interest--have arrived at the same results, as if they were made on "carbon paper," as those of the New York talks last September. The same climate, the same cautiousness, the same progress--on the American questions this time, whereas then the critical issue was the NATO question--the same bogging down on the Greek-Turkish questions. The only thing of interest is whether--just as our country returned to NATO a few months after the other talks--now the Greek-American agreement on the bases will be signed.

As one Greek diplomat characteristically observed, Mitsotakis emerged in a "depressed" mood from his meeting with American Secretary of State A. Haig. Something which confirmed the predictions and allowed one to interpret in its true dimensions the "step forward" which both the one and the other side alleged as the substantive feature of the talks.

From the--official--Greek side, this progress was the continuation of the negotiations, which means that the United States has accepted some of the Greek demands. But perhaps that is not where the significant outcome of the talks is to be found, since it would be somewhat difficult to believe that the government would ever break off its dialogue with the United States. At least such a thought is ruled out by the course taken up to now by the talks, which certainly have given--in fact, in a provocative way--the Greek side dozens of chances to break off the negotiations if it wanted to. But not even the chief Greek demands have been accepted, since "an agreement has not been arrived at." And given that "because of their critical nature, these demands are not negotiable," any progress means a backing down by the American side. Consequently the question which emerges is just what were the American gestures which persuaded the Greek side to "continue the talks"--although as we stated above, we do not believe these would have been broken off in any case.

These gestures were, on the one hand, the "giving in" of the United States on submitting new responses to the Greek demands, and also its promise to give satisfaction on certain issues which--for us--are less vital. And as assuredly has been demonstrated, the new American responses have not been able to bring about a rapprochement. Notwithstanding these things, the statement by Mitsotakis that the issue may possibly be resolved within the next 15 days is puzzling with regard to the solutions which could be accepted by the government, when it is known that the United States is not giving any permanent guarantee on keeping to the ratio of 7 to 10 in its aid to Greece and Turkey, is not giving any binding promise that it will energetically object to any attempt to use force to upset the balance in the Aegean, and--what is more important for our relations with the Arab countries--is insisting on using its bases for purposes which go beyond those specified by NATO.

Undoubtedly the entire development of this issue is "emerging" from the evaluation of the course our political affairs are taking, in connection especially with the possible results of the upcoming elections. To what is due, for example,

the American irreconcilability and what premises is Washington taking as a basis with respect to our political affairs such that it shows not only this attitude but also the inclination to have the agreement on the bases ratified even by the impending new Chamber of Deputies? In case this unsettled question is resolved by the end of May, does not the ND fear a certain political cost, in view especially of the elections, from the settlements which it will accede to? Especially when we have as given, on the one hand, the American insistence on positions which go beyond the aims of NATO in serving the foreign policy of the United States, and on the other hand the Turkish aggressiveness which the world seldom declines to link with the American support to Ankara?

The coming days are exceptionally critical with respect to the unresolved foreign issues, and either their resolution or their persistence, either way, will draw the election-campaign fire of the opposition. Undoubtedly the chances open to a small country compel it to move within certain limits in its responses. And what makes it easier on the government is that this reality has been accepted by the leader of the official opposition in his advancing of more realistic positions, particularly recently, on the issue of Greek-American relations. Equally indisputable, however, is the fact that confining responses within these limits is not so drastic that the only thing which it can provide to the responding country is the choice of a continuing conciliatory attitude.

The Domestic Policies of the ND

It seems that one event and one report which have reference to the governing faction will directly influence pre-election developments. The event in question is the statement by E. Averof, minister of national defense and contender, still, for the title of leader of the ND, with which he affirmed his loyalty to the governing faction--thus ruling out a pre-election split--and made assurances of the support which he will give, "regardless of whether or not he personally becomes politically active." The report is that apparently the issue of increasing the number of candidates for parliament has not been settled decisively.

The statement by Averof, which undoubtedly was a surprise, was interpreted by political observers as the choosing of a new tactic on his part. A tactic which does not expose him to the risk of being characterized as a disrupter of the party, which ensures him of the distinction of being "a national asset" so that he can offer his services at the suitable moment, and which in a certain way removes him from the responsibilities--especially prior to the elections--for a not very successful government policy on a great many domestic issues.

Supposing he does not actively campaign, Averof did not rule out behind-the-scenes political activity on his part, which will keep him close to the political limelight ("regardless of whether or not I am politically active personally"). With this declining to campaign--if he ends up making such a decision--he expresses his opposition to the government's line more strongly than anything he has done up to now, while fulfilling at the same time his promise to the founder of the ND to not cause any problems to the party. At the same time, he puts himself out of commission temporarily while awaiting the results of the elections, which will favor him in case the ND suffers an electoral collapse.

In addition, it seems that increasing the number of candidates for parliament will be raised again as an issue in the New Democracy Party, in a final effort to avoid "losing" its breadth. The argument which is advanced this time for introducing a measure which will again stir up storms within the governing faction is, in principle, that for the sake of maintaining the traditional rightist identity of this faction, as its spokesmen want, the votes of the centrist sector cannot be lost. On the other hand, the present qualitative sagging of the ND's political strength in relation to 1974 is asserted as an unshakable argument. Indicative of such arguments is what was written in an article by the pro-government KATHIMERINI in support of the introduction of this measure:

"The ND, having 177 deputies at its disposal already, is placing its hopes for some sort of renewal only on the pursuit of an increase in its parliamentary strength. A pursuit which, even if it is successful, will not bring it more than 10 new officers. On the other hand, if its electoral strength diminishes the loss this time will be more significant qualitatively, since usually such losses are noted in the front ranks of its officer force."

12114

CSO: 4908/167

SOARES SAID TO SEEK PRESIDENCY IN 1985

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 May 81 p 2

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Local Governments, Dissolution of the AR and Aim for Belem"]

[Text] 1. The Government's Handicap Ended

It had to happen sometime. Exactly 4 months have elapsed since the government headed by Francisco Pinto Balsemao took office and, as we have always claimed since the beginning, the time has come when the government is having to start facing a serious opposition.

For 4 months, it had a unique "handicap," as none of the other constitutional governments had: it has had maneuvering room to do what it wanted, with a PS [Socialist Party] that was completely paralyzed and a cautious PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], which acted strongly only during the interval between mid-April and the beginning of May.

Actually, the government started the marathon race with an advantage of 1.5 kilometers. But now, it must fight with adversaries filled with vitality, who will contest the decisive part of the competition step by step.

For this reason, on two occasions we warned the government that either it would take advantage of the "handicap" that it had, or else it could never do so again after the Socialist Party Congress.

Looking backward, one can summarize the way in which the government used its 1.5 kilometer advantage, as follows:

It maintained itself well, with respect to its social and political bases of support, as we observed last week;

It managed the affairs of political activity moderately well, without any major errors, and with balance and good sense;

However, it was less clear and incisive in the agreed determination of a political plan for the 4-year period;

It is still rather unsuccessful in terms of image among many of its members, which is tantamount to saying in terms of "political marketing" from the standpoint of Portuguese public opinion;

In short: there is a clearly positive aspect as a current government, and a less easy aspect as a lasting government for the future.

This being the case, the government has time and means for reinforcing "elan," reaffirming credibility and regenerating its image for the future.

As we remarked a week ago, the prime minister also has sufficient assets from the standpoint of prestige to undertake a thorough consideration of the organization, composition, plan and image of his government.

If he wants only a government that will run half a marathon, that is attainable. With a few boosts of optimism and timely support, it is a government that can maintain itself until the critical phase of preparing for and holding the local government elections, which will take place at the end of 1982.

If the idea is different, if it is to run the marathon until the finish, with victory in mind, then this government needs a non-deferrable revamping, a revamping of individuals in some instances; but, no less than this, an organic revamping, a precise plan and a new political "elan" in its public image. Only in this way can it be a strong government for the difficult test of local elections; a test in which experience abroad has proven that even the strongest governments falter.

The third notice has been given to the government. Long before summer, if this revamping is to be effective, it must be considered at length and carried out rapidly.

2. Soares' First Goal: To Rise in the Local Governments

The mere fact of the analysis of Mario Soares' strategy in this dramatic sequence of his after the Socialist Party Congress is, in itself, sufficient to make it understood that the good times are about to end for the government.

Because, as winner in Congress, Mario Soares will resolutely progress toward his next three goals: a marked gain in the 1982 local elections; pressure for the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic [AR]; and, finally, the candidacy for Belem.

Of the three, the most important by far is that of the candidacy for the presidency of the republic. Mario Soares was unwilling or unable to decide in 1980; but he will not allow the chance to run as a candidate in 1985 to elude him.

More than anything, the secretary general, acclaimed by the majority of delegates at the PS Congress, needs to demonstrate his force in next year's local elections.

A marked gain in the elections for the local governments will represent for Mario Soares the introduction of a factor of crisis in the AD [Democratic Alliance]; it will demonstrate the reinforcement of the PS and its electoral allies; and it will

mean the stopping, or retrogression of the PCP and its fellow travelers, within the APU (United People's Alliance).

To top it off, it would not be very difficult for the PS to gain somewhat in the local elections, just as it would not be at all difficult for the AD to show a decline, even if not very marked in the votes received.

The attrition in the local management and in the relations with the central government has been great, in many instances exacerbated by internal, personal and political factors within the AD.

Therefore, Mario Soares is counting on this breakdown in the AD and in a "leap" for the PS in the 1982 elections.

Therefore, Mario Soares will not miss an opportunity to take advantage of all the statements or actions which could appear divisive for the coalition in the government.

Therefore, Mario Soares needs to discipline the Socialist Party between now and October 1981, a method which means politically controlling fundamental decision-making centers which still elude it.

Of those decision-making centers, some essential ones are the Parliamentary Group, the Antero de Quental Foundation, certain federations and the Socialist Youth.

Mario Soares will have to captivate deputies associated with the Secretariat's line, to reverse the majority of the Parliamentary Group.

He will also have to substitute, or indirectly sponsor substitutions in the Antero de Quental Foundation and in the most hostile federations.

He has already begun to maintain that there is no autonomous youth organization in the other European Socialist Parties, the first step toward undercutting the Socialist Youth.

In brief, Mario Soares will have a summer and early fall striving to divide the sectors associated with the Secretariat's line, attempting to win part of it and liquidate the other part.

It should be understood that liquidating is not purging, as Mario Soares himself is fond of saying; it means only reduction to a lack of political voice within the party.

1. Soares' Second Goal: To Seek the Dissolution of the AD

Mario Soares' second goal will be, during the first quarter of 1983, to start seeking the dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic.

If Mario Soares obtains a victory, or at least a significant gain in the local elections, he will do exactly what Sa Carneiro did at the end of 1978. He will invoke the division, crisis and decline of the AD.

He will claim that the results of the 1980 elections and the composition of the Assembly of the Republic are no longer in keeping with the country's political situation.

He will assert that the electoral legitimacy stemming from the local elections is more recent and, therefore, invalidates the legitimacy resulting from the parliamentary elections.

In this way, he will attempt to wave the banner for dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic and the advancement of the date for general elections to the end of 1983.

On that occasion, there is every indication that the constitutional revision will already have been voted on.

Hence, the PS leader will try to accrue a twofold benefit from the dissolution of Parliament:

Advancing elections, accelerating the crisis in the AD and hampering its recovery after the decline in the local elections;

Ridding himself of certain Socialist deputies who have not concealed hesitant positions regarding him (and there will certainly be some who, in 1983, will still maintain a minimal consistency of positions with what they upheld in 1981...).

This second goal for dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic which, at the present time, appears logically in Mario Soares' strategy just requires one fundamental condition, and could meet with an unsurmountable obstacle.

It requires that the president of the republic, Ramalho Eanes, accept and foster such an initiative.

Hence the rapprochement that Mario Soares will attempt to achieve, at all costs, with President Eanes.

Hence Mario Soares will forget, within a few days, everything that he said about President Eanes.

Hence Mario Soares may even seem, unexpectedly to many, to be upholding positions regarding constitutional revision which no longer curtail the powers of the president of the republic, contrary to what might have been inferred from his statements made several months ago.

The rapprochement with Eanes has a price, in addition to which it is by no means appealing to one considering a candidacy for Belem to reduce now constitutional powers that might prove useful to him in the future, in the event that he were to be elected president.

Therefore, Eanes is the "sine qua non" condition for the viability of any dissolution of the Assembly of the Republic.

However, one must count on the possibility of a change in the political events between now and 1983, so that Mario Soares might have to reconsider his strategy regarding the dissolution of Parliament.

The fact is that he is only concerned about this second goal as a means for attaining the third one which is, indeed, crucial.

In the event that he might have to sacrifice one of them, Mario Soares would sacrifice the parliamentary dissolution to the main objective of reaching Belem.

So if, in order to take immediate advantage of the crisis in the AD, it appears more economical to him to dispense with the parliamentary dissolution, Soares may do so, provided this fosters a more rapid accord, to prepare for his candidacy.

4. Soares' Third Goal: To Reach Belem in 1985

Thus, we arrive at Mario Soares' third goal: access to Belem.

Essentially, the PS secretary general has already mentally established the ideal plan for reaching Belem: to negotiate with the PSD (Social Democratic Party) a central bloc ticket, on which the presidency of the republic would remain Socialist, and the government would result from the convergence of the two parties.

If the parliamentary elections establish the advantage desired by Mario Soares for the PS, Mario Soares will also want the position of prime minister for the PS.

If not, he will without any problems give that position to the PSD, in a government based on a coalition between Socialists and Social Democrats.

The operation that Mario Soares will attempt is not a very easy one to perform.

On the one hand, it will divide the AD, beckoning sympathetically to the PSD with the possibility of a coalition. On the other hand, Mario Soares needs to win the parliamentary elections, something which can only be achieved by guaranteeing that the PS will do well in comparison with the PSD, and which entails attacking the PSD.

But Mario Soares is skillful in this business of meticulous examinations, tactical fluctuations, wooing and quarrels on specific points. And he himself will undertake to head the wooing of the PSD, based on a "Scottish bath" (veiled declarations of love, followed by psychological insults, and so on). In the most immediate periods, and until the end of 1982, there will be more insults in public, and a few (very few) declarations of love in private....

One thing is certain: no one will take the spirit from Mario Soares, and he could reach Belem just as "his friend Mitterrand" reached Elysees.

Also strange is the almost psychodramatic manner that has marked Mario Soares' utilization of the Mitterrand victory.

Mario Soares emerged a winner from the PS Congress, although he encountered some unexpected and unpleasant surprises (for example, the 28 percent of the votes against him personally, despite the freedom of voting offered by the Secretariat's line), that is, until he learned about Mitterrand's victory.

Then Soares became transfigured. He geared his speech to the new circumstance, taking political advantage of it.

He compared Mitterrand's career to his own, even with respect to the criticism made by other French Socialist leaders of the monarchical style of the new president of France.

He identified that victory closely with new prospects for his own political destiny.

He could not resist, and flew to France, where Mitterrand, as had been anticipated, had more to do than be tied to him, even his greatest Portuguese friend.

He showed up unexpectedly at Mitterrand's luncheon with Michel Jobert, something that was reported, in some instances humorously, by several foreign correspondents.

All of us have had in our lives the embarrassing experience of having been selected for a new position with special responsibilities, obviously having too little time to prepare for the performance of such a task. And there have appeared friends, either well intentioned or trying to become associated with our success, who do not leave us alone for a single minute.

Mitterrand must have felt exactly the same way about "his friend Mario," who in this instance went to Paris in a rather provincial manner to show that he always backed the winners.

In any event, Mario Soares has started from this PS Congress toward the goal that lies in Belem, hoping to reach it at about 61 years of age.

And, say what you will about this clever, charismatic politician, who is also endowed with a maximum capacity for ideological fluctuation, this venture of his has possibilities.

Opposing him, there will be very little assistance from an AD which does not demonstrate in the future the ability to maintain positions in the local elections, to make the government viable, with competence and efficiency, until 1984 and to come up with a presidential candidate for 1985.

Mario Soares has already been launched; he clearly won over his Congress; he controls much essential leverage in his party; he has now received the protective and inspiring blessing of his Mitterrand.

All that he lacks is being able to call the Belem Palace his own.

2909

CSO: 3110/88

TAMAMES COMMENTS ON REASONS FOR RESIGNATION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 12 May 81 p 19

[Interview with PCE Deputy Ramon Tamames, by Joaquina Prades on 11 May 81; place not specified]

[Text] Ramon Tamames, Spanish Communist Party (PCE) deputy and assistant to the mayor on the Madrid City Council, yesterday officially left the party. Hours later, he communicated to Landelino Lavilla his wish to join the Mixed Group, which now will give the Communist Parliamentary Group 22 seats. He also resigned from his post in the City Hall, and was replaced by City Councillor Eduardo Mangada. In the following interview Tamames announces his decision to devote himself to creating the Association for the Defense of Democracy, an organization which, "if our ideas are in agreement," could participate in the coming general elections in coalition with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party]. He also explains his reasons for leaving the PCE.

[Question] Why have you left the PCE?

[Answer] Because many of us have been trying to change matters in that party for a long time, and we have not accomplished anything. I had already stated very clearly the need for a thorough reorganization at the plenum of the Central Committee in November. At that time the results were very negative; but to date there has been no indication that things might change, and the best proof of this is that of the 51 amendments to the proposed statute which I presented in the plenum of last week, not one has been accepted, at least no important one.

[Question] Which were the amendments you considered important, the ones which perhaps would have made you reconsider your decision to resign?

[Answer] The same ones as always: the creation of a federal body in the party government; the setting up of a collegial secretariat; respect for the minority; decentralization of the party; establishment of a maximum age of 65 for the post of first secretary-general, or the condition that this secretary can only be reelected once; that is, his term of office would not exceed 6 years, so as to avoid traumatic situations such as replacing a secretary-general who has been there for decades and ends up being in the post for life.

[Question] And out of all that you accomplished nothing?

[Answer] Nothing. And since opinions that tend to energize, to debureaucratize and to democratize the party are not accepted, it means that the desires and aspirations of the people are not respected in the PCE, that its political line is on a rough course, and that it has ceased to be a party of the masses, so it keeps losing members everywhere. The PCE should have been a political force in the service of social change and of the shaping of modern Spain, and certainly it does not appear to be taking that path.

'Party Bureaucracy Has Created a Defeatist Atmosphere'

[Question] But you said a few moments ago that there are many people in the PCE who are thinking about reorganization.

[Answer] Yes, many. Many at the rank and file level, the vast majority, I would say; many in the intermediate cadres, and some within the Central Committee. The thing is that because of the suspicion toward more or less organized groups which exists, this party has never had a powerful grounding of those forces. But there are many of them. That as many as 26 in this last plenum were in favor of Eurocommunism and reorganization is truly significant.

[Question] But then, if there are so many, and if it appears that some hope of change could be entertained, how is it that you did not wait for the 10th Congress and do battle from within?

[Answer] Because I have been battling for a long time without any positive results. More than a year ago Santiago Carrillo and I held talks on these subjects, and it never came to anything. And what happened in the latest plenums of the Central Committee has only confirmed the failure: there has not been the slightest concession to reorganization. Also, here is something truly disturbing: in these few months which remain before the 10th Congress the party bureaucracy has taken it upon itself to create an atmosphere of pessimism, of defeat, of the conviction that nothing is going to change. I cannot exist in an atmosphere like that. Therefore, I have a very clear conscience, and am very sure that this was the time to resign. Do you know something? It seemed immoral to me to stand by watching the progressive destruction--which in my opinion I believe inevitable--of a party which has fought hard, which was very important during the transition, and which had a great future ahead of it.

[Question] From your words it could be inferred that the PCE has begun an irreversible decline, something for which there is no solution.

[Answer] I am not that pessimistic. I believe that everything has its solution; the thing is that to reach that solution right now and with the present structure of the party would really be very difficult.

[Question] Then do you believe that Carrillo is the one responsible for that bureaucratization, which according to many observers, if it keeps up, could lead to the PCE picking up as many votes in the coming elections as it has members?

[Answer] Well, I don't want to be dramatic or to create positions of permanent tension, and so... Santiago Carrillo could have put himself at the forefront of the reorganization of the party, and he has not done so. Time will tell what the consequences of that decision of Carrillo's will be; but I am convinced that, as regards the elections, those consequences are going to be very negative for the PCE.

[Question] Do you think that your departure will be followed by that of other communist members, especially intellectuals and professionals?

[Answer] I don't know. Some friends and comrades have called me, and I understood that they were very upset and worried. But certainly I have not told anyone that they should join or leave. Those things are too serious, and everyone should decide them for themselves.

[Question] And now, what are you going to do?

[Answer] Political life is not confined to the PCE, much less to the PCE under its present leadership. My political vocation has deeper roots, and I am sure that democracy and progressivism are flags which can be defended from many types of organizations and associations. And, well, the future is always ours.

[Question] You have used the word association, not political party. Are you referring to the projected Association for the Defense of Democracy?

[Answer] It has no name yet; but there are going to be people from various parties in that association or foundation, without that involving double membership. It is going to be a place for citizens to meet, where questions and problems of politics and culture will be debated; but I cannot say more because it is still being worked out.

[Question] But, really, don't you anticipate participating more actively in politics? For example, taking part in the coming elections in coalition with some progressive bloc?

[Answer] Look, I'm not thinking about that yet. The foundation is in the planning stage, and is not set up for election purposes.

'I Always Expected To Stay'

[Question] Whatever you say is going to be published, and if you enter into some electoral coalition in the 1982 elections, the readers could remember this contradiction.

[Answer] Yes, yes. All right, I didn't say that we wouldn't do it. Right now it is still much too early to make this type of statement but later we'll see.

[Question] However, if a coalition of the right is formed for the elections the most closely related progressive forces will have to make an alliance and will have to think of something.

[Answer] Those things are all in the future. I agree that they are in the nearer future than many people think, because there are those who are trying to form this rightist coalition, which, again, appears to me to be a big step backward for Spain. But if that project materializes, it is clear that all the progressives will come out in opposition. In any case, this type of position must be taken as a team, after debating the subject among all the members of the governing board of the foundation, provided that we have a significant public following in 1982.

[Question] Yes, but on a personal level you must have opinions on the subject. Would you be in favor of a coalition with the PSOE?

[Answer] I think the PSOE is as respectable a party as any, and if our ideas coincide, then certainly I would be in favor of cooperating together in the elections.

[Question] A high official of the PCE (Jaime Ballesteros in EL PAIS on Sunday) said that you have been planning your political future outside the party for a long time.

[Answer] I have heard something about that, although I don't remember who said it. It surely must have been some specialist in reading other people's minds. But it is not true. One always has political projects in mind, but what I can promise with complete sincerity is that this association project never implied that I would abandon the PCE. I could have done the two things perfectly well simultaneously. I have resigned for the reasons which I have explained. Really, up to the last moment I thought I would stay in the party of which I have been a member for a quarter century.

9131
CSO: 3110/112

RELATIONSHIP OF REGIME TO CITIZEN ASSESSED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 31 May 81 p 8

[Editorial by Metin Toker]

[Text] Things are going well for Turkey in general. Or to be more specific, things are going as well as expected or can be expected. The military regime has not taken a single step backwards since 12 September. An interim constitution is in force that has made very few changes in the original. If its character and authority are still unclear--qualities candidly discussed and debated--no one doubts that a constituent assembly will be convened around October. This will at least create a forum and impart added clarity to the government's mode of operation. Spring of 1983 is seen as the date of transition to normal democracy with the preparation of a new constitution, a referendum, the election, a new political parties law; the start of political activity within a new environment; and the reemergence of political bodies. In terms of its institutions and system, this democracy will certainly be different from pre-12 September democracy. It cannot be subject to as easy a degeneration as its predecessor. The need for occasional military intervention will not arise. Naturally, general and free elections will constitute its foundation, but the state cannot be vulnerable to a ready and irresponsible destruction. Thus, in addition to parliament, several institutions, which will receive an equal legitimacy from a democratic constitution, and the system itself will stand as guardians of the state.

It is recognized that there is no single approach to democracy. British democracy is not a carbon copy of French democracy and French democracy is not a carbon copy of German democracy. Their fundamental principle is to ensure the transition of power through general and free elections. Their electoral procedures, however, differ from one another. There is no doubt that in Turkey a viable and enduring "Turkish form of democracy" will be established. It should not be forgotten that the people want this--not a return to the old way--and expect it. Just as it is true that anarchy and terror lost a great deal of their power with the reemergence of the state and just as this factor has allowed citizens to breath freely, the means to implement a fixed economic policy have now been ensured with the state's return to viability.

I will mention the tax laws.

Their drafts were pigeonholed in the old parliament. The two major parties were in agreement on the fundamentals. But no matter which of these parties--insane in their refusal to cooperate under any circumstances--came to power, that party stymied the passage of the other's bills. The National Security Council promulgated all of them immediately. Again, the government's understanding of its public role has resulted in stability for the Turkish lira. It has created the opportunities to borrow on the international private money market. This will proportionately reduce the twisting of Turkey's neck by other governments--albeit they are our allies. Although the economy's structural illness persists, the treatment for this conjunctive malady is to embark on the proper path.

Yes, things for Turkey in general are as well as can be expected.

But the same cannot be said for the citizen in particular. It is true that the 12 September regime is in the final analysis responsible for the citizen's being given back "the right of life," which is the first of all rights. But the preventable shortfalls and discretionary errors in numerous decisions, regulations, and laws have become subject to complaint in everyday life. Clearly, Turkey in general effects the citizen in particular. But this occurs within the framework of a process. As for daily life, it goes on. It is not right to infuse unnecessary, irrevocable, or undetested difficulties into this daily life. The thorough restructuring of taxes is a good one. Yet, it is disconcerting that in everyone of these the tax burden is being dumped right on the same taxpayer rather than further broadening their scope. There is no doubt that "broadening" is hard while "dumping" is easy. The regime should not forget that it is obligated to break away from "dumping" and push toward "broadening."

Although the rationale is acceptable, recent price increases have overstepped their bounds. The faces that smiled for a moment have grown dour. The state is taking back in exact measure what it had given. If cigarettes or liquor are regarded as an "enjoyment," then consuming sugar and having heat are rights. The high cost of heating will be even more painfully felt come autumn.

The regime has begun taking on certain sectors. Regulations to this end can be made more circumspect by hurting fewer people and protecting its own partisans even in these sectors. Successful regulations are those in which the arbitrary aspects number fewer than the reasonable features. As the enthusiasm of those first days fades--as it inevitably must--the more the conduct of the regime's public relations--toward which there has grown an expectation of more subtlety and discernment--has fallen into the hands of well-intentioned amateurs. The administration cannot explain quite a few of its troubles. And this cannot be done simply through the statement and speeches of General Evren. It is vital that these be bolstered.

The citizen should not be confronted with too many crises in his daily life. This should not be interpreted as a desire to disrupt adherence to rules, laws, and procedures. That was how the politician understood it. That was his mistake. And that was how the state was destroyed. There will undoubtedly be numerous crises. But it is a necessity that these be endured spiritually and physically. Details that impact on daily life are at times even important in the general sphere of things.

I fear an overlooked existence for this borderline.

So it is that the present regime will be confronted by significant opposition, subterfuge, pressure, and--as an upshot--degenerative efforts with respect to work that must be completed by the spring of 1983 in the most crucial areas of the system. The blows will come from both within and without. Cries of "It isn't democratic" will gradually reach fever pitch from those who see the 11 September system as democratic, those who regard the disbanding of parliament as democracy's punishment, and those starting to say, "Everything can be straightened out just fine another way." Outside Turkey these perceptions will be given credence, sometimes because of platonic devotion to abstract rights, sometimes because of an international solidarity among politicians, but, most often, because of an inability to disseminate the facts. The commotion will reach fever pitch particularly in Europe and European organizations. With an eye to preserving their own good fortunes, seizing the opportunity to grandstand, and satisfying their personal pride, those who want the old system to remain intact will do their utmost to prevent a sound "Turkish form of democracy."

Have not Medes-France and Mitterand in France characterized General de Gaulle's "French form of democracy" as entirely "the rule of the center-right," "dictatorship," and "the armor of the capitalist bourgeoisie"? And since Giscard has not attained the stature of his predecessors de Gaulle and Pompidou, the system and this democracy with its institutions opened French doors just fine to a leftist government. This is to say that the system's democratic nature is not just so many words. Moreover, this system has led the 5th Republic neither to a national debacle like that experienced by the 3rd Republic nor to the state's destruction at politicians' hands as was the case in the 4th Republic. Why has the system been able to resist 23 years of counter-attacks?

Because the citizen discerns that the system affords stability for France in general and a better life for himself in particular....

The current regime during its own interlude--and even during the transition period--is in dire need of this type of citizen appraisal. The attacks this regime will encounter are going to be severe, destructive, and shattering. The citizen is its most powerful base of support, its only powerful base of support.

This assessment is taking root throughout Turkey in general, and, for the citizen in particular, it is impressing a need for greater caution, discernment, and subtlety.

CSO: 4654/1

DEFENSE MINISTER SOGAARD DISCUSSES REINFORCEMENT POLICY

[Article by Defense Minister Poul Sogaard]

[Text] In an INFORMATION editorial dated 24 April 1981 I was asked to answer five questions on the reinforcement problem. I am happy to oblige and hope this will contribute to a realistic discussion.

1. With regard to the first question about a definition of crisis situations that might justify calling in reinforcements I must reply that such a definition cannot be given. This involves a concrete evaluation in a given situation and such an evaluation would be made by the Danish government after consulting with the political parties, perhaps through the Foreign Policy Board. The evaluation would include information received from Danish military and civil authorities as well as from NATO. It is not quite established however whether the Danish government and only the Danish government would decide if a crisis is grave enough to warrant asking for reinforcements to be sent to Danish territory. With regard to the question of whether a Russian intervention in Poland would be regarded as such a crisis the same observations apply. But it stands to reason that reinforcements would be considered only if a crisis develops into an attack on or a threat to a NATO country.

2. I have already answered the question of who has the authority to call in reinforcements under 1, but for the sake of completeness I would like to add that there are three elements in the decision-making process on calling in reinforcements, namely in addition to the government requesting reinforcements, the government supplying them and the NATO council that represents all member nations. Thus a reinforcement operation could only be carried out if all three authorities listed here agree that reinforcements are needed.

If a decision is made to supply reinforcements, the supreme commander of NATO would be authorized to conduct the practical implementation of the operation.

The reinforcement plan on which the government recently took a stand of principle enumerates certain units to be used on Danish soil and elsewhere. These units are of various types and the question of whether this or that unit should be sent to Danish areas in a reinforcement situation would depend among other things on the tasks to be accomplished.

3. With regard to the third question concerning the geographical location of any reinforcements in Denmark, there will of course be various possibilities and a concrete choice will depend on the situation at that particular time.

Incidentally, allied reinforcements will be part of the NATO command system which means in practice that they will be under the command of the chief of the command unit who would of course always be a Danish officer.

4. The question of whether reinforcement units could bring nuclear weapons to Danish territory without having the Danish government take a stand on this can be answered with a clear no.

5. With regard to the question of what happens if there is a disagreement between the defense command, the government and NATO as to whether or not a threat exists--which would affect the evaluation of whether reinforcements are needed--I will refer back to my remarks under questions 2 and 3. No reply can be given in advance; the evaluation of the concrete situation is what will count.

Let me repeat briefly that an absolute but not a sole condition for bringing allied reinforcements to Denmark is that the government deems the situation grave enough to feel there is a need for the presence of allied forces.

I hope these lines will drive a stake through some of the misconceptions that have persisted in the reinforcement debate, first and foremost the allegation that with our support for the NATO reinforcement plan we have committed ourselves to accept reinforcements in a period of tension or in a war situation. We have not. But we have helped to leave such a possibility open, depending on the situation. It is in that light that the NATO reinforcement plan should be viewed. It gives the alliance and us more possibilities and thus greater flexibility and credibility. But we are still talking about sovereign nations that in accordance with the principles of the NATO treaty are not subject to any supranational authority.

6578

CSO: 3106/119

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SPOKESMAN FOR MILITARY SEES BUDGET PACT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 1 May 81 p 14

[Text] Nonsocialist moves in defense negotiations have brought things closer to a compromise in the view of the Social Democratic spokesman.

"It is my estimation that there is now a realistic chance to arrive at a defense compromise in this session of Folketing. As the negotiation picture looks now there are prospects for a compromise soon between the former defense compromise parties. And it is not very likely that the Radical Liberals will go along with a compromise."

So said Social Democratic defense policy spokesman Preben Steen Nielsen to INFORMATION after the parties taking part in the talks on a new defense act met Thursday with Defense Minister Poul Sogaard.

Preben Steen Nielsen added that in that case a compromise would be reached on the basis of the government's latest negotiation move, that is an unchanged economic framework and an increase of 44 million kroner to strengthen land defenses on Sjaelland. "The compromise could be for 2 or 3 years," Preben Steen Nielsen said.

"The reason I consider it likely that the former compromise parties are close to accepting the government's negotiation offer is that our offer will be withdrawn unless they agree on a solution quickly. If they do not it means we will have to extend the so-called zero solution which involves defense reductions. And it would be politically unacceptable to the nonsocialist parties to have defense standing without broad political support," said the Social Democratic spokesman.

Then you think the compromise will be approved by the Social Democrats, the Liberals, the Conservatives, CD [Center-Democrats] and the Christian People's Party but not the Radical Liberals?

"Not as long as the Radical Liberals stubbornly maintain that defense must not have more than the zero solution provides. If the Radical Liberals want to be included they will have to move a little," said Preben Steen Nielsen.

More Draftees

At the meeting with the defense minister the Liberals, Conservatives, CD and Christian People's Party presented a joint indication that they would like to see a larger number of draftees called up.

The four parties asked the minister to find out if this expansion in the number of draftees could be financed by the employment funds earmarked for combatting youthful unemployment by means of the labor minister's employment plan among other things. The parties thought that in this way another 3600 draftees could be acquired.

The government and the Social Democrats will not accept this linking of employment measures and defense financing immediately, Preben Steen Nielsen stressed.

"They are using the wrong angle of approach here. For one thing the armed forces are not set up with the goal of creating jobs, for another more jobs can be created by investing public funds in all other sectors besides defense. So we simply won't accept that argument," said Preben Steen Nielsen.

Broad Solution

Conservative political leader Poul Schluter said Thursday noon on Danish Radio's "News Magazine":

"Our negotiation move on getting more draftees should be viewed as an attempt to shift the defense debate away from the unfortunate rigid position on whether the military should get an economic increase of 0 or 3 percent. We want to get away from a discussion of percentages. And since at the same time we want to maintain a credible defense and the government wants to make an extra effort to combat youthful unemployment we found our proposal to draft more people and pay them with employment funds a reasonable one.

"We hope this has contributed to finding a broad political solution on defense. It would be most unfortunate if we cannot arrive at such a solution," said the Conservative leader.

Similar statements were made Thursday by Liberal and CD spokesmen.

In response to Preben Steen Nielsen's remark that the Radical Liberals are unlikely to take part in a future compromise, Radical defense spokesman Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen said: "I don't believe that. If the nonsocialists get 3600 new draftees paid with employment funds in addition to the various technical career extensions that have been discussed and that have been included in the negotiations we will quickly get up to an extra billion annually for defense. That will be impossible for the Social Democratic Folketing group to accept.

"If a compromise is reached on that basis it will also create problems for the current negotiations on a compromise on the 1982 budget," Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen told INFORMATION.

REPORTERS VISIT KARLSBORG MISSILE TESTING BASE

Armed Forces' Test Area

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 81 p 8

[Article by Kjell Lofberg: "Sweden's Most Heavily Guarded Lake; New Missile Systems Are Tested There!]

[text] Karlsborg, May 81--Vattern is Sweden's most heavily guarded lake. The reason for that is that the Swedish Armed Forces' missile systems are tested there. Among other missiles being tested just now are 15 which are intended for the Navy. They are to be on all Swedish torpedo boats in a few years.

The Armed Forces' test area is located on a point of land north of Karlsborg. The Materials Department of the Armed Forces (FMV) has located its missile-testing area (RFK) and ammunition-testing experiments (AP) there. A good 160 people are working for the FMV in Karlsborg at present. That number is to be reduced to 140 in accordance with the Defense Department's proposal for reducing the Swedish peacetime defense organization.

"The reduction of the number of personnel means that all tests take longer, but we are still going to be the best in the world," says Bertil Grimland, the head of the RFK. "Vattern is unique as a missile-testing area. It lies right in the very center of an area which is good from the point of view of secrecy. It is harder for the big powers to see what we are doing there. The fact that the lake is a long one means that we can locate measuring stations on both sides of it. In the United States, they perform test firings out over the ocean, and they have to install measuring instruments in aircraft there, and that is considerably more expensive," he says.

A good 95 percent of all missile testings are carried out with missiles mounted on aircraft. Various functions in the missile system are tested in that way. Only at the very end of the test series is a missile fired at a simulated target.

Half a Million Kronor for Each Test Firing

"We test fire perhaps one missile per month. We carry out the rest of the test in some other way. The fact is that a firing of a test missile is extremely expensive--approximately half a million kronor," Grimland says. "For that reason, we try to perform as few firings as possible."

The measuring stations around Vättern converge at the guidance center in Karlsborg, where the results are taken charge of by a data-processing installation.

The measuring instruments used by the RPK in testing missiles are chiefly theodolites, radar installations and telemetric instruments.

A theodolite is a large camera with optical telescopic instruments. With a theodolite, one can track small objects a long distance away at the same time they are being photographed. Theodolites are provided with TV target-tracking devices, which means that when the operator has picked up "the target" he reads the instrument. Then the theodolite follows the target's movements automatically.

Radar installations are aimed at the "target" automatically. Then one can follow the "target" (a missile or an aircraft) on a radar screen. A radar station can determine the position of a target itself, while two or three theodolites are required on the same target to determine its correct position. "It is extremely important for us to be able to track the missiles from the guidance center during the tests," says Bengt Grimland. "Specifically, we must be able to destroy the missile if any trouble arises during the test and the missile deviates from its course."

All the data involved in a test are shown on a "plot board" in the guidance center. One can follow the missile's trajectory to the "target" there.

"A missile crashes after the test, as a rule, and the technicians always want to know what happens during the test in regard to target-seeking-device data, temperature, rudder angles, attitudes, etc.," says Grimland. "All those data are transmitted from a telemetric transmitter in the missile during the test and are recorded on tape in our telemetric reception installation. Those data are then evaluated after the test.

"Some of the targets at which the missiles are test-fired are radio-controlled model aircraft which are called "bumblebees" and some of them are radio-controlled sea targets which consist of steel structures which resemble scaffolding. Test firings at stationary targets are also carried out. A rock formation a few hundred meters south of the island of Röknen constitutes such a target," he says.

"During the tests, we also have target cameras mounted on the simulated targets," he says. "Consequently, we always put the missile a little to the side of the target. In that way, we also save materiel."

The Swedish Armed Forces began to be interested in guided missiles during the 1950's. Until late in the 1970's, the test area in Karlsborg was heavily safeguarded by security measures. During that period, the O4 missile was tested. At present, it exists in an attack version and a pursuit version, and it is mounted on the Swedish Viggen aircraft.

At present, the way the test area in Karlsborg functions is that the Armed Forces or industry move into the RPK to carry out tests. Then the personnel of the RPK carry out the tests which are ordered. Then the material is submitted to the organization which ordered the test. More than 80 percent of all tests are performed for the Armed Forces.

Missiles Are Salvaged

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 May 81 p 8

[Article by Kjell Lofberg: "Missiles Are Salvaged"]

[Text] Karlsborg, May 81--The boat Victoria has just left the island of Roknen in Vattern when the following hail is heard:

"An aircraft is missing in the waters around Igelbacken. Go there and search!"

The Victoria is one of the boats which belongs to the RPK's organization. On the days when missiles are test-fired by the RPK, the test-firing area involved must be kept free of boats. That section is cared for by the RPK's boat organization, together with the security division, which takes care of Vattern by means of various kinds of apparatus, including radar and telescopes.

"But according to international agreements, we can only ask the people to leave the area," says Bror Gustavsson, who is in charge of the boat organization. "If they refuse, we have to postpone the test firing until the area is free."

"The RPK's boats are also used to salvage missiles, and we also get assistance from F 6's helicopters for that work," he says. "We also run a rescue service, together with the helicopters, on Vattern."

The Lake Swarms with Recreation Boats

In the summer, there are swarms of recreation boats on Vattern. The Gota Canal actually crosses Lake Vattern between Motala and Karlsborg. To give recreation boats space, the RPK discontinues all test firings during July and during weekends in June and August.

"The rescue service on Vattern within that area has been built up at our initiative. Of course, it seems natural for us to take part in that service since the RPK already has boats for that purpose and there are helicopters on F 6," Bror Gustavsson states, while at the same time a little red spot can be perceived on the water around Igelbacken. It is a small raft, and a man is lying on it.

The boat Victoria maneuvers up to the raft, and one of the F 6's helicopters surfaces there. But there is no need for the helicopter's personnel to take any action. The crew of the Victoria take care of rescuing the individual on the raft themselves in the calm weather which prevails just then.

Nothing is seen of the aircraft which was reported missing. That is quite all right, since this was only an exercise.

The crew of the Victoria has carried out its mission and Stig Eklund, from F 6, can step ashore dry-shod after having played the part of the pilot of a crashed aircraft on the waves of Lake Vattern for half an hour.

9266

CSO: 3109/192

MILITARY, CIVIL PILOT MEDICAL EXAMINATION CENTERS

Paris AIR ACTUALITES in French Mar 81 pp 33-36

[Article by Dr Blanc, director of the CPEMPN]

[Text] Although there are four CEMPVN [Centers for Medical Evaluation of Flight Personnel], one for each of the four air regions in France, the one in the second region also has a special mission, and for this reason it is known as the CPEMPN [Main Center for Medical Evaluation of Flight Personnel].

Its activity has steadily increased during recent decades because of the development of aviation. The great number of examinations given there reflect the growing complexity of equipment that is constantly becoming more expensive, and subjecting the pilot's body to constraints that did not even exist in the past. The medical personnel working at the CPEMPN have had to become more and more specialized in order to meet the needs of what has now become a new branch of medicine, aerospace medicine.

A Valued Tool

This "extreme" specialization, which is sometimes a disadvantage, here has many beneficial consequences: it is a valued tool for the air force, and civil aviation also benefits greatly from this center; another beneficiary is the ordinary medical practitioner who makes use of the advanced techniques employed here*.

This is one of the main features of this center, in which aviation medicine, both military and civilian, blend harmoniously to the satisfaction and for the benefit of all flight personnel.

*The ALAT [Ground Forces Tactical Air Support] pilots take their regular medical exams in a CEMPVN. The PN [Flight Personnel] of the Naval Aviation Service only take their entrance medical examinations there.

This medical center, which has been part of the air force since 1935, covers a surface area of 2,000 square meters. In its six floors it includes all the standard medical resources. There, in a minimum period of time, an entrance exam or periodic re-examination can be given, a diagnosis can be drawn up, and "risk factors" can be determined. A knowledge of these risk factors is essential before the medical aptitude certificate required for the candidate's specialty can be issued.

The General Medicine Service is "at the heart" of this organization. This should not surprise us, as cardiovascular problems are the second leading cause of mortality in France, and the first cause of medical unfitness decisions made during a person's career.

In addition to the standard clinical examination which includes taking blood pressure and an EKG, today more high performance techniques have been introduced here:

- a. A sonocardiogram records heart sounds and any anomalies.
- b. Echocardiograms evaluate the movements of intracardial valves and the efficiency of the heart muscle itself.
- c. A "doppler," a nontraumatic method, provides information on the speed of intra-arterial blood circulation.
- d. A maximum effort test can be given in a hospital environment.

All these methods available to the specialist can reliably test the resistance of the cardiovascular system to the constantly growing constraints imposed by the modern and future combat aircraft, in a minimum period of time, and with no risk. Some "cardiac lesions" which were formerly unsuspected because they were at a subclinical level, can now be visualized and inventoried, thus sparing the patient a sudden death, which would have been inexplicable in the past.

ORL (Otorhinolaryngology)

Hearing and speech are closely interrelated. These two functions, which determine how an individual will function in society, in space are vital for safety.

Tonal and vocal audiometry, impedancemetry (a more recent examination used to test reliably the ear-nasal cavity interdependence) are highly accurate and so the sometimes "overly favorable" results given in the past are no longer possible.

Disturbances in equilibrium during flight may cause vertiginous phenomena which are well known to pilots. They may sometimes be responsible for flight incidents or even accidents. The ORL specialist can not understand, interpret, and treat these problems if he does not have a very thorough knowledge both of aviation and of the pilot himself. This is an area in which aeronautic specialization is essential to the medical practitioner, despite the use of the electronystagmogram, for its interpretation requires both a great deal of knowledge as well as a great deal of wisdom and caution.

OPH (Ophthalmology)

Visual information is preponderant in aeronautics, both for the flight personnel whose attention is required by the air space and the data on the aircraft display console, as well as for the ground personnel dealing with air traffic and air defense.

An ophthalmological evaluation is designed to test the professional capability of applicants to determine if the operation of the visual apparatus is compatible with the performances required for the applicant's chosen specialty, and during periodic re-evaluations to determine if aeronautic activity is having any deleterious effects on the visual apparatus. This concern enhances air safety and the individual's visual anatomic and functional integrity.

For these purposes, three types of tests are employed:

- a. A complete anatomic examination of the eye and its parts by using standard clinical procedures: biomicroscopy, ophthalmoscopy, tonometry, etc.
- b. Functional examinations which attempt to test various functions in "real life" situations. These tests cover the light sense (night vision, resistance to sudden flashes of light), the sense of shape (optometry), the sense of color (colored safety signals used in aviation), and spatial vision (stereometry), as such situations may arise for flight personnel on the job. The standard ophthalmological examinations are still valid and are fully used, especially when a defect is found and a precise diagnosis must be determined.
- c. Electro-physiological explorations. In some cases these explorations may confirm a diagnosis, determine a prognosis, or even determine the iatrogenic effect of a general course of treatment. Such explorations make use of the electroretinogram, the electrooculogram, and of visual fields. The importance and quality of these examinations

explain the role this discipline plays in the percentage of those determined unfit.

Neurology

We often hear people say that modern life has become more and more stressful. The very word "stress" only appeared relatively recently. Nor can modern aviation escape from the harmful "spinoffs" of progress. But fortunately drug therapy has also been modernized. It has become an effective tool in the hands of a skilled neuro-psychiatrist.

But in our field of aviation, drug therapy can be a double-edged sword. Making a rapid evaluation of a situation and a decision that must be no less rapid will not tolerate any slowness of thought or the euphoria induced by some drugs. And here again, the hammer used to test reflexes, and the EEG exam can only aid the specialist. For all of the specialist's knowledge will be of no use if he does not have, along with the trust of the person being examined, a perfect knowledge of the environment in which his patient lives.

These four aspects which are most specific to aeronautic medicine represent, however, only one facet of the many activities of this center, which also has a radiology service and a laboratory which can handle the many demands made of it by regulations and by the experts using it.

This means that such a "tool" needs highly skilled users. If medicine is an art that is attempting to become more and more scientific, medical evaluation is certainly the most difficult exercise of this art: to the rigor of the scientific knowledge which must be perpetually kept up to date, to the perfect knowledge of the environment and of the regulations, the practitioner must add a profound feeling of the human aspect of this profession, but without forgetting the economic and financial concepts entailed in issuing a decision of medical aptitude or a decision to terminate a person's career. That is why the professors of the health service and specialists or assistants who work in the armed forces hospitals represent the mainspring of this center, whose activities are many and varied.

Standard medical evaluations--subject to strict standards--are everyday work at this center. These exams are given to all military flight personnel of the second air region and also to civilian flight personnel whose companies have their headquarters in Paris. Their examinations are given on either an annual or bi-annual basis, depending on the duties of the person in flight. At the end of this exam, which no one can avoid, a certificate of aptitude is

given to the examinee and to his company or unit. This attests to the physical and mental integrity of the person examined. About 60 medical evaluations are done every day, on the average.

Second Opinions

But the decision, once made, can be appealed.

- a. Military personnel can appeal the decision to the superior medical commission of the armed forces flight personnel.
- b. Civilians have the civil aviation medical council.

In either case, this is the "court of final appeal." At this higher level, non-medical considerations--such as aeronautic experience--may be weighed in order to enable a skilled pilot to continue his career, either with or without restrictions.

These appeals, which are a standard part of the French legal system, mean that the examinee will be treated impartially, but on all levels one absolute rule predominates: strict respect for the standards demanded by air safety. This is the main article of faith on all levels.

The head of each medical service in the Paris CPEMPN is, because of his duties, a top expert in both military and civilian medicine. He is therefore qualified to intervene:

- a. At the request of the superior medical commission of the armed forces flight personnel for military cases;
- b. At the request of the civil aviation medical council to judge a problem that the provincial centers or overseas centers have been unable to resolve.

If the medical resources of the CPEMPN are inadequate, the top expert is authorized to order any examination which he feels is necessary, such as a vascular stress test or radioisotope scans, to be conducted at any military or civilian hospital in Paris.

We can say without any fear of error that over 95 percent of the difficult problems which arise are solved at the CPEMPN. In these conditions it would be unfortunate if the skills of the medical personnel of this center were not used in activities that are somewhat less specifically aeronautic.

Education

That is why a general or specialized medical consultation service is open to military personnel or to persons entitled to this benefit, upon appointment. This activity also fulfills a need for the expert who should not, medically speaking, allow himself to become isolated in too narrow a specialization. This is also why specialized surgeons (ORL and OPH surgeons) perform surgery in military hospitals throughout the Paris region. Their teaching activities also benefit the surgeons themselves.

The medical professors are responsible for teaching aeronautic medicine at the Air Force Health Service School, to which they belong by statute.

Many lectures are also given at the request of military or civilian organizations to which these medical experts offer the fruit of their experience.

Some Revealing Statistics

These statistics show the importance of this center and of its activities. During 1980 approximately 17,000 medical evaluations were conducted. 4,500 of these were for the air force, and 12,500 for civilian aviation.

Over 250 cases requiring evaluation by an expert were examined. Over 44,000 consultations were conducted for military and civilian personnel entitled to this service. The medical specialists spent 250 hours in teaching, thus enabling them to train their successors in this field and to teach aeronautic medicine.

The first French cosmonaut who will soon travel into space was selected at the CPEMPN, with the aid of the Aerospace Medicine Laboratory of the Bretigny Flight Test Center. This fact reveals the value of the CPEMPN in its service to the state and to its armed forces.

7679
CSO: 3100/705

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

19 JUNE 81